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THE PRYING NOSE:
FLORIDA V. JARDINES AND
WARRANTLESS DOG-SNIFF TESTS
ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
ALI MIRSAIDI
I. INTRODUCTION
K-9 units have become an invaluable resource for police
departments and federal agencies in the war against drugs. A trained
dog’s keen sense of smell alerts officers to the presence of
contraband, thereby leading to the prompt apprehension of drug
traffickers, dealers, and the like. The United States Supreme Court has
approved warrantless use of K-9 units in several situations: public
1
airports, routine drug stops, and narcotics detection points. In Florida
2
v. Jardines, the Court will determine for the first time whether sniff
tests on private premises violate the Fourth Amendment. This case
will serve as a conduit for the Court to refine the Fourth
Amendment’s protections of the home. The Court will address
whether sniff tests within the curtilage of an individual’s residence
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court will
likely decide that its holdings in previous dog-sniff cases, which
involved private property in public places, are inapplicable to the facts
present in Jardines. Additionally, because dog-sniff tests violate a
homeowner’s reasonable and justifiable expectation to be free from
the government’s prying eyes (and nose) within his home, they likely
violate the Fourth Amendment.



2014 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. See generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding sniff test of an
automobile during a routine traffic stop did not constitute a search); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding sniff test of an automobile during a narcotics detection
stop did not constitute a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding sniff test
of luggage at an airport did not constitute a search).
2. Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2012).
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II. FACTS
In November 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade
Police Department received an unverified Crime Stoppers tip that
3
Respondent, Joelis Jardines, was using his home to grow marijuana. A
month later, Jardines’s home was the subject of surveillance by the
Miami-Dade Police Department, the Narcotics Bureau, and the Drug
4
Enforcement Administration. The surveillance began at 7 a.m., when
Detective Pedraja briefly examined Jardines’s house while waiting for
5
a drug detection dog and his handler to arrive. When the drug
detection dog, Franky, and his handler, Detective Douglas Bartlet,
6
arrived, the two conducted a “sniff test” on Jardines’s property.
The dog-sniff unit and Detective Pedraja entered the property
7
through the driveway and headed toward the front door. During the
sniff test, Franky was at the lead followed by Detectives Bartlet and
8
Pedraja. During the approach to the front door, Franky picked up the
9
smell of contraband and alerted his handler of the odor. Although
Detective Bartlet had not crossed the archway immediately adjacent
to Jardines’s front door, Franky’s sniff test culminated in him sitting at
10
the base of the door, indicating the strongest point of the odor.
After Detective Bartlet told Detective Pedraja that the sniff test
was positive, Detective Bartlet and Franky left to assist with other
11
cases. Detective Pedraja left approximately fifteen minutes later to
12
prepare a search warrant for Jardines’s house. During this time,
federal agents “remained behind to maintain surveillance of Jardines’
13
home.” After obtaining the warrant, police officers and federal
14
agents gained entry to Jardines’s home. Jardines was apprehended
15
after fleeing from his home through an exit at the rear of his house.
3. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla. 2011) cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (U.S. Jan. 6,
2012) (No. 11-564).
4. Id. at 46.
5. Id. at 37.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2012).
8. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 46.
9. Id. at 46–47. A detection dog’s alert consists of bracketing—a technique involving a
back-and-forth walk until the dog finds the strongest point of the odor, at which point the dog
sits. Id. at 47.
10. Id. at 46–47.
11. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 4.
12. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 48.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment has long protected the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
16
against unreasonable search and seizure. . . .” Despite the Fourth
Amendment’s historical rooting in the idea of protecting private
property against physical invasions, the Supreme Court since clarified
17
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” To ensure
searches are conducted in compliance with the Fourth Amendment,
18
they must first be approved by a judge or magistrate. Warrantless
searches are presumptively unlawful because the Constitution
requires that the “deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer
19
be interposed between the citizen and the police.” To determine
whether Fourth Amendment protection applies to a particular case,
the Court employs Justice Harlan’s expectation-of-privacy analysis. To
trigger the Fourth Amendment, a person must exhibit an “actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to
20
recognize as reasonable.” Originally proposed in Katz v. United
21
States, the standard was accepted by the Court in Smith v.
22
Maryland. Ultimately, Jardines requires the Court to reconcile two
heretofore distinct lines of Fourth Amendment case law—cases
governing privacy rights within the home and cases concerning the
use of dog-sniff tests.
A. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Afforded in the Home
Though the Court has affirmed that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment extend beyond mere property rights, it has also
reiterated that the home remains central to the Fourth Amendment’s
23
protections. In two distinct cases, the Court has held that warrantless
searches that reveal private information concerning the home are
Fourth Amendment searches when the private information could not

16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
18. See id. at 357 (“[T]he mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to
judicial processes . . . and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
(quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. 442 U.S. 735 (1979); id. at 740; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
23. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51.
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24

be obtained otherwise.
A Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever details concerning
the interior of the house are uncovered using a technological or
25
26
sense-enhancing device. In United States v. Karo, DEA agents
placed a beeper into a can of ether that would later be used to process
27
cocaine. The can had been moved periodically until it ultimately
28
entered the defendant’s possession within his home. Although “the
actual placement of the beeper into the can violated no one’s Fourth
29
Amendment rights,” the monitoring of the beeper constituted a
30
Fourth Amendment search of the defendant’s residence. Though the
Court acknowledged that “the monitoring of an electronic device . . .
is, of course, less intrusive than a full scale search,” it nonetheless
“reveal[s] a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the
Government . . . could not have otherwise obtained without a
31
warrant.”
Additionally, privacy protection does not vanish simply because
the devices used to obtain protected information never entered the
32
33
home. In Kyllo v. United States, agents of the Department of the
Interior used a thermal imaging device “to determine whether [the]
amount of heat . . . emanating from petitioner’s home [was] consistent
34
with the use” of high-intensity lamps used to grow marijuana. Unlike
in Karo, the device was used from beyond the curtilage of the
35
defendant’s home. Nonetheless, the Court held that information

24. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2011) (holding the use of an infrared
scanner a Fourth Amendment search because it could reveal, among other private details, “at
what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath”); United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding the placement of a beeper inside a can that entered the
defendant’s home a Fourth Amendment search because it revealed private details of the home;
that is, the location of the can).
25. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (stating there is no distinction between the government agent
who enters a home without a warrant to obtain information versus the government agent who,
without a warrant, uses technology to obtain the same information).
26. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
27. Id. at 708.
28. Id. at 708–10.
29. Id. at 711.
30. Id. at 714.
31. Id. at 715.
32. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–36 (2011) (holding the use of an infrared
scanner from beyond the curtilage of a home to be a Fourth Amendment search because it
reveals private details about the interior of the home).
33. 533 U.S. 27 (2011).
34. Id. at 29.
35. Id. at 30.
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obtained using “sense-enhancing technology . . . regarding the interior
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained . . .
36
constitutes a search.” Furthermore, the Court clarified that the
distinction between “off-the-wall” and “through-the-wall” imaging
devices does not alter the substance of whether a Fourth Amendment
37
search has occurred. Finally, the Court indicated that the quality of
the information obtained also has no effect on the Court’s analysis
38
because “all details [of the home] are intimate details.” Although the
Government “contend[ed] that the thermal imaging was
constitutional because it did not detect private activities occurring in
39
private areas,” the Court disagreed. In reflecting upon its previous
home-related cases, the Court held that none of its cases have been
decided by the “quality or quantity of information obtained,” but
rather “because the entire area is held safe from prying government
40
eyes.”
B. The Fourth Amendment and Searches Involving Drug-Detection
Dogs
The Court has reviewed whether the Fourth Amendment protects
41
private property subjected to dog-sniff tests three times. Despite the
42
varying factual contexts of the three cases, the Court held in each
43
case that the sniff tests did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In

36. Id. at 34.
37. Id. at 36. In Kyllo, the government argued that no information was gleaned concerning
the interior of the home via the thermal imager. Id. at 35. Instead, the device merely captured
heat eradiating from the “external surface of the house.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court
rejected the “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz.” Id. In Katz, a
listening device was placed on the outside of a telephone booth to record the defendant’s
conversation inside. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1987). Although the Court
acknowledged that “no physical penetration of the telephone booth” had occurred, the Fourth
Amendment had been expanded to encompass intrusions beyond physical trespass. See id. at
351–53 (noting that the Court has departed from the “narrow view” that the Amendment
requires the presence of a physical intrusion onto a property interest).
38. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding sniff test of an
automobile during a routine traffic stop did not constitute a search); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding sniff test of an automobile during a narcotics detection
stop did not constitute a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding sniff test
of luggage at an airport did not constitute a search).
42. It is important to note that all three cases involved private property seized in public
places.
43. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (“Official conduct that does not ‘compromise any
legitimate interest in privacy’ is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting
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these cases, the Court held that searches were permissible because
citizens do not have a legally protectable interest in possessing
44
contraband.
Sniff tests of private property exposed to the public, such as
45
luggage in an airport, are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
46
In United States v. Place, the Court reviewed the seizure of Raymond
Place’s personal luggage at an airport, which was later subject to a
47
sniff test. Although Place, like all individuals, retained “a privacy
interest in the contents of personal luggage,” the sniff test conducted
on his luggage did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search for two
48
reasons. First, sniff tests invade no legally protected interest because
49
they merely reveal the presence of contraband. Second, no actual
“search” within the Fourth Amendment occurs during sniff tests
because the tests do not involve opening luggage, are minimally
intrusive, and do not subject the owner “to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive”
50
methods.
Similarly, sniff tests conducted during a lawful traffic stop do not
51
amount to a Fourth Amendment search. In Indianapolis v. Edmond,
the Court analogized “an exterior sniff of an automobile” for
narcotics detection at a highway checkpoint to the search conducted
52
in Place. Because sniffs “do[] not require entry into the car and [are]
not designed to disclose any information other than the presence of
narcotics,” no Fourth Amendment search occurs. The Court
elaborated on the issue of sniff tests during lawful traffic stops in
53
Illinois v. Caballes. In Caballes, the Court reiterated that no Fourth
Amendment search occurs without a violation of a legitimate interest

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (“[A]n exterior
sniff . . . is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of
narcotics.”); Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (“Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence
of narcotics, a contraband item.”).
44. See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
45. Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
46. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
47. Id. at 699.
48. Id. at 707 (emphasis added). More particularly, the sniff tests do not expose
“noncontraband items that would otherwise remain hidden from public view.” Id.
49. See id. (noting that sniff tests expose limited information only relating to the
possession of contraband).
50. Id.
51. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
52. Id. at 40.
53. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
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54

in privacy. Because individuals do not have a legal interest in the
possession of contraband, dog-sniff tests that reveal contraband do
55
not constitute searches.
In Jardines, the Court will have to clear the blurry line that divides
legally acceptable behavior from acts that amount to Fourth
Amendment searches. On the one hand, it has repeatedly held that
private details concerning the home are protected by the
Amendment, regardless of the information that is revealed. On the
other hand, it has approved dog-sniff tests for detecting contraband
because they do not invade a legally protected interest. Because the
two propositions cannot stand together, the Court must decide which
principle is stronger when sniff tests occur on private property.
IV. HOLDING
56

In Jardines v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that a
warrantless sniff test conducted within the curtilage of an individual’s
home—specifically, the area adjacent to the front door—is a violation
57
of the Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the court first
analyzed whether the Supreme Court’s prior decisions concerning
58
sniff tests were applicable to the facts presented. After answering in
the negative, the court considered whether dog-sniff tests performed
on a person’s property constituted a Fourth Amendment violation for
59
separate reasons.
The court first discussed the dog-sniff cases examined by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that
sniff tests of a person’s property in public violated no Fourth
60
Amendment protection. Although the factual background of each
case varied, two consistent themes emerged. First, dog-sniff tests are
61
sui generis because they reveal only limited information using a

54. Id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984)); see supra note
43 and accompanying text.
55. Id.
56. 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564).
57. Id. at 55–56.
58. Id. at 44–45.
59. Id. at 45–50.
60. Id. at 40–42.
61. “Of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th
ed. 2009). The Supreme Court has stated that sniff tests are treated as “sui generis because
[they] disclose[] only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.” Caballes, 543
U.S. at 409.
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62

method “less intrusive than a typical search.” Second, the Fourth
Amendment protects an individual’s “legitimate expectations of
63
privacy” which excludes the possession of contraband.
In
distinguishing Jardines’s situation from the other dog-sniff cases, the
Florida Supreme Court stated that “the United State Supreme Court
was careful to tie its ruling to the particular facts” of each particular
case. Furthermore, the court noted nothing indicated the analysis
64
would apply to a “sniff test conducted at a private residence.” The
court further distinguished the facts in Jardines by explaining that
each of the dog-sniff cases involved property that had been exposed
to the public and that the tests were minimally invasive and applied in
65
a non-discriminatory manner.
The court then considered whether the Fourth Amendment
protects homes from warrantless sniff tests performed on private
property. Without specifically discussing which interest the Fourth
Amendment protects, the court determined that dog-sniff tests
conducted at private residences constitute “a substantial government
66
intrusion into the sanctity of the home.” The court first explained
that the “sanctity of the citizen’s home” is “[a]t the very core of the
67
Fourth Amendment.” The court then noted two specific ways sniff
68
tests invade the sanctity of one’s home. Specifically, the court stated
that sniff tests are “a sophisticated undertaking” that “invariably
entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment
for the resident” regardless of the homeowner’s presence during the
69
search. Additionally, the court noted that sniff tests performed at
private residences lack the “objective, uniform application of [the]
70
tests” that were guaranteed in the dog-sniff cases. Because “a private
residence is not susceptible to being seized beforehand based on

62. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 40 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40
(2000)).
63. Id. at 40–41.
64. Id. at 45.
65. Id. A major focus for the Jardines court was the invasiveness of the sniff test on
Jardines’s house versus the invasiveness of the sniff tests in the dog-sniff cases. For example, the
court highlights the humiliation that residents may suffer in their neighborhood when their
homes are surrounded by federal and state agents and subjected to a sniff test. See id. at 48–49
(“Such a public spectacle [the sniff test] unfolding in a residential neighborhood will invariably
entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment for the resident . . . .”).
66. Id. at 49.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 46–50.
69. Id. at 48.
70. Id. at 49.
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objective criteria,” the court felt that dog-sniff tests, such as the one in
the present case, could be applied in an “arbitrary or discriminatory
71
manner, or based on whim and fancy, at the home of any citizen.”
V. ARGUMENTS
Both parties’ briefs focus on how the Court’s earlier dog-sniff
cases and privacy-in-the-home cases inform whether sniff tests of a
residence are searches under the Fourth Amendment. The State of
Florida contends that the location of sniff tests does not alter the
expectation-of-privacy analysis and that the search violates no
legitimate interest in privacy because the sniff test detects only
contraband and not private information concerning the home. By
contrast, Jardines argues that sniff tests violate a homeowner’s
expectation of privacy because they reveal private information about
the home. Jardines also argues that the warrantless sniff test of his
private residence effectively was a common-law trespass, thereby
72
constituting a Fourth Amendment search.
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
The State appeals from the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on
two grounds. First, the State argues that a dog-sniff test is not a Fourth
73
Amendment search because of its sui generis nature. Second, the
State argues that a dog-sniff test does not become an unlawful search
simply because it takes place within the curtilage of a private
74
residence.
The State first examines the dog-sniff cases and notes that the
Court has repeatedly held that dog-sniff tests are lawful because they
75
are sui generis and “much less intrusive than a typical search.”
Additionally, because sniff tests do not “disclose any information
other than the presence or absence of narcotics,” no legitimate
76
interest in privacy is violated, and therefore no search has occurred.
The State relies on Caballes to extend the reasoning of the Court’s
dog-sniff cases to the facts presented in Jardines. The State argues that
the Caballes Court distinguished Kyllo from Caballes based on the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
This argument has not previously been raised in this case.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 13 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
Id. at 14–15.
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nature of the information obtained, rather than the location of the
77
test. The State also references the Caballes Court’s reliance on the
78
contraband exception established in United States v. Jacobsen in
arguing that the contraband exception exempts “from the Fourth
79
Amendment . . . the method of finding . . . contraband.”
The State then argues that sniff tests do not become unlawful
searches simply because they occur immediately outside of a home.
The State contends that the Fourth Amendment does not “proscribe
officers from approaching the front door of a home,” and thus dogs
80
are not prevented from approaching alongside the officers.
Additionally, since the plain view doctrine does not protect “[w]hat a
person exposes publicly,” information obtained by an officer’s vision
81
or sense of smell does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, the State argues that sniff tests reveal nothing about the
interior of the house but only information about the “air outside the
82
house.” Finally, the State analogizes the “use of a dog’s nose instead
of that of an officer’s” to a tool, which merely aids police officers’
83
senses, much like a flashlight.
The State distinguishes the dog-sniff test in Jardines from the
infrared camera scans discussed in Kyllo by discussing the
84
“fundamentally different nature” of the tools. For example, the State
highlights the difference between the “binary nature” of sniff tests
and the ability of emerging technological devices to detect lawful, as
85
well as unlawful, activity. Unlike the methods at issue in Kyllo, the
State argues, dog-sniff tests cannot reveal “information other than the

77. Id. at 16.
78. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). In Jacobsen, the Court explained that warrantless seizure of
contraband does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because there is no “justifiable
expectation of privacy” in possessing contraband. See id. at 121–22 (noting that seizure of
contraband was acceptable because “it is well-settled that it is constitutionally reasonable for
law enforcement officials to seize ‘effects’ that cannot support a justifiable expectation of
privacy without a warrant.”).
79. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 16–17.
80. Id. at 20 (“No serious argument exists that the Fourth Amendment proscribes officers
from approaching the front door of a home.”).
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id. (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 22. The government relies on the approved use of tools to aid an officer’s senses.
Id.
84. Id. at 23.
85. See id. at 23–24 (“Unlike the high-tech devices in Kyllo and Jones, or even the low-tech
flashlight in United States v. Dunn, dogs are not high-tech or ‘advancing’ devices that threaten
privacy.”).
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location of a substance that no individual has the right to possess.”
Furthermore, the State distinguishes sniff tests from technology-aided
searches by arguing that dogs have been used “for centuries all
87
without modification or improvement.” Because sniff tests do not
“represent rapid technological change” that “permit[s] easy and cheap
monitoring” of private facts in private residences, the State argues
that “the rationale of Kyllo and [the] concerns of Jones do not apply”
88
to dog-sniff tests.
Finally, the State addresses a policy concern raised by the Florida
Supreme Court in Jardines. Specifically, the State argues that the dogsniff test is a century-old law enforcement technique that is not
susceptible to abuse in the form of dragnet-style sweeps of entire
89
neighborhoods. The State claims that no such sweeps have occurred
since Caballes and, moreover, sweeps of entire neighborhoods would
90
be both time-consuming and costly in practice.
B. Respondent’s Arguments
In response, Jardines argues that sniff tests on private property
violate the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. First, such tests
presumptively violate a homeowner’s reasonable expectation of
91
privacy. Second, sniff tests on private property are a form commonlaw trespass which further violates a homeowner’s reasonable
92
expectation of privacy.
Jardines contends that the use of a sniff test violates the
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy because it reveals the
93
intimate, private details of the home. Jardines emphasizes Kyllo
when arguing that “the nature of the information obtained . . . is not
relevant to the determination of whether a Fourth Amendment
94
search has occurred.” Jardines bolsters this argument by analogizing
95
the facts of this case to Karo and Arizona v. Hicks. In Karo, even
though the “only thing detected” was the presence of contraband, the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 23 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005)).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23–25.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 27–28.
Brief for Respondent at 9, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 21.
480 U.S. 321 (1987); Brief for Respondent, supra note 91, at 21–25.
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Court held that a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. Because
the police had obtained information concerning the interior of the
house that could not have been obtained otherwise, a warrant was
97
required, despite the search’s minimal intrusiveness. In Hicks, police
received a warrant before obtaining information related to the
98
interior of the house. The warrant, however, limited the scope of the
search, and action that exceeded that scope and revealed unrelated
99
information constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Both cases,
Jardines argues, illustrate that the exposure of intimate details of the
home—whether without a warrant or beyond the scope of a
warrant—violate the homeowner’s reasonable expectation of
100
privacy.
Jardines then distinguishes the dog-sniff cases from his case. First,
Jardines argues that the location of the searches in Place, Edmond,
101
and Caballes are key aspects of each case’s outcome. All three cases
102
involved private property located in a public place. Jardines argues
that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy about the
details inside the home, whereas individuals who expose their private
103
property in a public place do not retain that interest. Specifically, the
dog-sniff cases “do not involve the historical foundations of the
Fourth Amendment” that protect the home “from prying government
104
eyes.”
Jardines also highlights the risk of invasive and indiscriminate
105
random searches. Contrary to the State’s position, Jardines argues

96. Brief for Respondent, supra note 91, at 21–22.
97. See id. at 22 (discussing the occurrence of the Fourth Amendment search in Karo
despite the fact that “a beeper is less intrusive than a full search.” (quoting United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
98. Id. at 23–24.
99. Id. Even though the officers possessed a warrant, “action, unrelated to the objective of
the authorized intrusion . . . produce[d] a new invasion . . . unjustified by the exigent
circumstances that validated the entry.” Id. (quoting Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325).
100. See id. at 23–24 (“Nevertheless, the Court held in both cases that the officer’s acts in
disclosing the presence of . . . objects inside the home constituted a Fourth Amendment search
because all details in the home are held safe from prying government eyes.”).
101. See id. at 29 (“The Court’s decisions demonstrate that whether a police action reveals
details inside a home is the critical factor which establishes that the governmental action is a
Fourth Amendment search.”).
102. Id. at 26–32.
103. Id. at 29.
104. Id. at 30.
105. See id. at 32–39 (discussing the policy implications that would result if “law
enforcement officers could release a trained cocaine-sensitive dog . . . to roam the streets at
random . . . .” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
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that allowing suspicionless sniff tests incentivizes states to create
technologies that could reveal the presence of contraband, or other
106
private information, with minimal overhead. If police are able to
perform dragnet-style sweeps of neighborhoods, “the protections of
the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be
107
secure . . . only in the discretion of the police.”
Jardines also argues that sniff tests violate the Fourth Amendment
because they reveal information about the interior despite detecting
odors outside the home. In Karo, there was “no difference between
the acts of a government agent in entering the house . . . and the
surreptitious use of an electronic device to obtain the same
108
information.” This view is consistent with Kyllo, which addressed the
intrusiveness of technological devices used to obtain private
109
information from a home that was not otherwise available.
Additionally, Jardines argues that, contrary to the State’s position, a
110
dog’s nose is not a tool that aids the senses of the police officer. And
finally, Jardines addresses the State’s exterior/interior dichotomy by
noting that the Court rejected similar arguments in both Katz and
111
Kyllo.
Jardines concludes by arguing that a sniff test outside the door of
a private residence is a Fourth Amendment search for two additional
reasons: first, the front door is within the curtilage of the house; and
second, entering onto private property to administer a sniff test is a
common-law trespass. Because the curtilage of the home is
“intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically,”
112
the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to extend to it.
Jardines concedes that egress and ingress do not immediately trigger
the Fourth Amendment because of the implied consent given for a

dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106. See id. at 37–38 (“Presumably . . . States will be just as eager to use current technology
and develop and use new technological innovations which will reveal only the presence of
contraband inside a home.”).
107. Id. at 37 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
108. Id. at 40.
109. Id. at 41–42.
110. Id. at 43. Rather, narcotics dogs use their own senses to provide the officers
information, rather than enhancing the officers’ senses to similarly detect the same information.
Id.
111. See id. at 45–46 (discussing the Court’s rejection of an “off-the-wall” versus “throughthe-wall” distinction in Kyllo and “inference” argument in Karo).
112. Id. at 48 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986)).
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private citizen or police officer to enter the premises for various
113
reasons. Nonetheless, there is no implied consent for police officers
to enter the premises with the intent to obtain “otherwise
114
undiscoverable evidence.” Therefore, even without a reasonable
expectation of privacy, “a police officer’s actions . . . can constitute a
Fourth Amendment search” when the officer’s intent is to search for
115
evidence.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
It is likely that the Court will rule in favor of Jardines, once again
affirming that the sanctity of the home remains central to the Fourth
Amendment. First, the Court will likely find that its previous dog-sniff
cases are inapplicable within the context of a private residence.
Second, the Court will likely hold that Jardines’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in his residence was violated when a
warrantless sniff test was conducted on his private residence.
The Court will likely rule that Place, Edmond, and Caballes are
inapplicable within the context of private residences. The dog-sniff
116
cases all involved private property outside of the home. Unlike
Jardines, the individuals in the dog-sniff cases possessed no legitimate
private interest that could be intruded upon by a sniff test—at least,
117
not in the possession of contraband. No search occurs unless a
118
legitimate interest in privacy is compromised. Jardines, however,
maintained a right to be free of the government’s prying eye within
119
his own home. To be sure, the Caballes Court was careful to
reconcile its decision with Kyllo, where the use of technology to
discover private information within a home was considered a Fourth
120
Amendment search. The Court found that “the fact that the device

113. See id. at 53, 55 (“A person who enters upon the property of another is not a trespasser
if consent to enter may be implied from custom, usage, or conduct.”).
114. Id. at 55.
115. Id. at 59.
116. See discussion supra note 1.
117. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“We have held that any interest
in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate’ and thus, governmental conduct that
only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest.” (quoting
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118. Id.
119. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s
protections of the intimate details of the home).
120. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10.
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was capable of detecting lawful activity was critical to Kyllo.”
However, reading the Caballes decision so narrowly would be at odds
with Kyllo itself. In Kyllo, the Court stated that “[t]he Fourth
Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to
122
measurement of quality or quantity of information obtained.” If the
search in Kyllo implicated the Fourth Amendment solely because the
device used could detect lawful information, then the Fourth
Amendment’s protection must necessarily be tied to the quality of the
information obtained.
Furthermore, the location of the tests in the dog-sniff cases
invariably played a crucial role in the Court’s analysis. Assuming,
123
arguendo, that sniff tests can reveal legitimate information, the dogsniff cases would be no different than Kyllo absent the location of the
test. On the other hand, if sniff tests are in fact sui generis, the cases
would be identical to Karo. In either scenario, discounting the
location of the sniff test would result in incompatible outcomes. In the
former, allowing sniff tests at the home would be inconsistent with
Kyllo’s prohibition of information gathering using sense-enhancing
124
technology. In Karo, the placement of a beeper could only reveal
the presence of unlawful activity (akin to a sniff test’s sui generis
results), yet the Court found that its placement amounted to a Fourth
Amendment search. With little else to distinguish the cases, the
location of the searches must play a significant role in the Court’s
determination of whether a search has occurred.
Second, the Court will likely find that Jardines’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in his home was violated when sniff tests were
conducted on his private residence. In Kyllo, the case most analogous
to Jardines, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs

121. Id. at 410.
122. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
123. See Brief for The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. as Amicus
Curiae for Respondent at 8–15, Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564 (U.S. July 2, 2012), for a
discussion on dog-sniff tests revealing legitimate information protected by the Fourth
Amendment.
124. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home . . . constitutes a search . . . .”). If sniff tests can
reveal information concerning legitimate and lawful activities, the result should be no different
than the outcome in Kyllo. At the very least, the agents in Kyllo gained information concerning
the house using technology from beyond the curtilage. Here, the information was gathered from
within the curtilage, signaling a greater invasion of Jardines’s residence. See United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (likening the placement of a tracking beeper inside Karo’s home
to the physical intrusion of Karo’s property).
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when information concerning the interior of the home is obtained
125
without a warrant. When DEA agents used a thermal imager to
detect “information . . . that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical intrusion,” a Fourth Amendment search had
126
occurred. Despite the Government’s argument that sniff tests are
sui generis and reveal nothing but the presence of contraband, the
127
Kyllo Court already rejected a similar argument. Because “all
details are intimate details,” the Court did not distinguish between
activities that suggested the possession or location of contraband
128
from private, lawful activities. This view is consistent with the
Court’s holding in Karo. There, information obtained via an electronic
device placed inside the home was deemed to be a Fourth
129
Amendment search. Notably, the Court reasoned that the search
occurred because the information “could not have been obtained by
130
observation from outside the curtilage of the house.” In Jardines, the
sniff test occurred within the curtilage of the house, which suggests
that the sniff test was an even greater intrusion into Jardines’s right to
131
retreat into the confines of his own home than the intrusion in Karo.
This view is consistent with the Court’s analysis in other Fourth
132
Amendment cases. For example, in California v. Ciraolo, the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when police
flew a private charter plane over a marijuana field in his uncovered
133
backyard. Although the Court recognized that the curtilage is
protected by the Fourth Amendment, the defendant’s public exposure
of the field moved him beyond the purview of the Amendment’s
134
protections. More importantly, the Court focused its decision on the
125. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 37.
128. See id. at 37–38 (discussing how the relative warmth of the home was an intimate
detail, despite it possibly relating to lamps used to grow marijuana).
129. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. The intrusive nature of the sniff test may be cause for a heightened review of the
existence of a Fourth Amendment protection. A physically invasive inspection may expose an
individual to “great indignity . . . and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” Bond v. United States,
529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968)).
132. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
133. See id. at 214 (“[I]t is unreasonable for respondent to expect his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye . . . .”).
134. See id. at 213. (“The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been
extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares.”). The Court explained in Katz, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”
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defendant’s voluntary exposure of the marijuana, suggesting that had
it remained covered and “protected from being observed with the
135
naked eye,” the Fourth Amendment may have been implicated.
Jardines, on the other hand, took steps to prevent “observ[ation] with
the naked eye” or, in this case, the nose, by keeping it within his home.
136
In Bond v. United States, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when a federal agent engaged in a “careful tactile
exploration of the outer surface” of the defendant’s bag, which was
137
placed in the overhead bin of a bus. Although the agent discovered
methamphetamine—in which Bond had no legitimate privacy
138
interest —he nonetheless had a reasonable expectation that his bag
139
would not be handled in such an “exploratory manner.”
Homeowners, including Jardines, have an even stronger expectation
that their homes will not be subject to warrantless sniff tests or other
exploratory searches, regardless of whether or not their homes are
being used for unlawful purposes.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court will likely reaffirm the sanctity of the home as a central
tenet of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in deciding Jardines.
Because the sniff test conducted on Jardines’s residence varies
considerably from earlier dog-sniff cases, the Court will likely use
Kyllo and Karo to distinguish the legality of such tests in a privateresidence context. To hold otherwise would surely chip away at
Fourth Amendment protections, largely diminishing the traditional
importance of the private details of one’s household.

United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1987) (emphasis added).
135. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
136. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
137. Id. at 337–38.
138. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
139. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338. Bond’s expectation, which society recognized as reasonable,
translated into a Fourth Amendment protection. See id.

